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Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa
Taimur Khan
November 26, 2018
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), launched in 2015, is an independent,
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Cover Photo Credit: REUTERS/Feisal Omar
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About the Author
Taimur Khan is a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington as well as
a journalist who has written extensively on the contemporary politics of the Gulf Arab states
and Pakistan. He covered U.S. Middle East policy from Washington and New York for The
National newspaper, and more recently reported for the paper on the region as a Gulf-based
correspondent. He received a Nation Institute Investigative Fund grant for his reporting on
Pakistan’s role in the global methamphetamine precursors trade. His recent work has focused
primarily on the Gulf region, and over the course of the last three years he has reported from
across the Gulf Cooperation Council states on the cultural, political economic, and security effects
of the low oil price environment and the geopolitical flux in the Middle East. His current projects
include research and reporting on competition among Middle Eastern powers for economic
and political influence in the Horn of Africa, Pakistan’s evolving ties with the Gulf states, and the
interplay between Shia identity and politics in Pakistan and the current turmoil in the Middle East.
His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, World Policy Journal, Al Jazeera America,
Men’s Journal, Critical Muslim, GQ.com, New York Magazine, and Devex.
The AGSIW Gulf Rising Series
Over the last decade the Gulf Arab countries have energized their role in regional politics, from
the use of military intervention, to increased bilateral foreign assistance, to more robust regional
coordination. This, combined with a perception of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East, has
prompted Gulf Arab countries to seek and establish strong relations with other centers of power
– regionally and globally.
This paper was developed as part of AGSIW’s Gulf Rising series analyzing the energized role of the
Gulf Arab states in the international system. The series looks beyond Gulf Arab relations with the
United States to examine ties with other key countries and regions. Additionally, it investigates
motivations behind Gulf Arab states’ foreign policy choices and evaluates the implications for U.S.
foreign policy toward the Gulf Arab states and the region.
Taimur Khan | 1
Executive Summary
The Gulf Arab states’ engagement with the countries of the Horn of Africa dates back at least
to the postcolonial era of the 1950s and 60s. Over recent decades, however, the Horn of Africa
has become a region of increasing geostrategic and economic importance, as the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia have sought to establish a long-term military and commercial
presence on both sides of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, in an effort to cement their status as
regional powers.
Even as the Gulf Arab states are deepening their engagement in the region, the Red Sea basin
has also re-emerged at the heart of global geostrategic competition among China, Europe, the
United States, and Russia. This intense interest has given far greater leverage to Horn of Africa
leaders to bargain for better deals or play patrons off one another.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia recently demonstrated they could leverage relationships to play a
positive role, brokering a historic rapprochement between bitter rivals Ethiopia and Eritrea
that could be transformational for the region in terms of economics, security, and stability.
But at the same time, the Saudi and Emirati rivalry with Turkey and Qatar has spilled over,
exacerbating pre-existing divisions and raising questions about whether the Gulf Arab states
are more of a destabilizing force in the region. The long-term implications of a growing Gulf
presence in the region and what this means for local political dynamics is unclear. What is
evident, however, is that as Gulf Arab states exert greater influence in the Horn of Africa, the
region’s future is being reimagined.
Introduction
This paper was informed by research and interviews conducted in Somaliland and Kenya as
well as a workshop hosted by the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington on the increasing
geostrategic and economic importance of the Horn of Africa for Gulf Arab states, and the
opportunities this creates for governments and other elites in the region. For the United Arab
Emirates and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia cementing their status as regional powers
depends to a significant extent on their ability to establish a strategic, long-term military
and commercial presence on both sides of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. Ports and trade
infrastructure that will connect fast-growing eastern Africa to Asian markets via hubs in Dubai,
Abu Dhabi, and elsewhere in the Gulf Arab states, will position the two Gulf allies as key regional
players. As such, they will almost certainly engage with actors in China’s Belt and Road Initiative
or any competing bloc or country’s strategies to tap African markets and resources. Naval and
other military facilities on both sides of the narrow waterways also enhance the importance
of the UAE as a maritime security partner and counterterrorism force multiplier in Yemen
and the Horn of Africa. This permanent military footprint outside the Arabian Peninsula also
provides a stronger platform from which to compete with rivals Turkey and Qatar, and Iran.
This intertwined security and economic engagement allowed Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to be in
the right place at the right time to help broker a historic rapprochement between bitter rivals
Ethiopia and Eritrea that could be transformational for the region in terms of economics,
security, and stability. If the Gulf countries can somehow repeat this unexpected diplomatic
Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa | 2
feat by bringing Egypt into an agreement over water rights with Ethiopia and Sudan, the result
could be tectonic. It is, however, far from certain that the fast-changing domestic politics
in the Horn of Africa countries, and the deft balancing of regional governments by foreign
competitors, will allow for such an optimal outcome.
This growing integration between Gulf Arab countries and the Horn of Africa is not only key
for understanding emerging regional dynamics. The Red Sea basin has also re-emerged at
the heart of global geostrategic competition among China, Europe, the United States, and
Russia. Developments in the region provide an instructive lesson – and a view to the future –
in the multipolar, transactional, and realpolitik nature of geopolitics untethered from a status
quo or defined balance of power. The emerging regional powers of the Gulf Arab states are
maneuvering to take advantage of this new environment, working in partnership with super
power rivals Washington and Beijing when it suits their perceived interests.
From Destabilization to Regional Peace?
Since 2015, the involvement of Gulf Arab countries in the Horn of Africa in many ways has been
perceived as destabilizing. This has been illustrated by the spillover of the Emirati and Saudi
rivalry with Qatar and Turkey into Somalia, whose fragile governance and security gains have
been undermined by the new patrons and exacerbation of the pre-existing centrifugal political
forces in the country. National and subnational leaders have all reaped the benefits of their
highly personalized relationships with officials from Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, in terms
of financial and other rents in exchange for loyalty with particular Gulf state strategies. On
one hand Doha, in coordination with Turkey, has supported the Somali president, Mohamed
Abdullahi Mohamed, known as “Farmajo,” financially, which has allowed him to consolidate
his grip on power in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, including by forcing the media and
political rivals into submission, building
a Turkish-trained army unit composed
in part of recruits drawn from Islamist
networks,1 and to continue working to
rein in the leaders of federal member
states. The UAE, on the other hand, has been backing federal leaders and the self-declared
state of Somaliland in part to weaken the Qatari-backed central government in Mogadishu.
Both patrons have supported leaders against political and clan rivals, which has been a
destabilizing dynamic that has drawn public criticism from the traditional Western actors in
Somalia whose influence is waning.
Beyond the Gulf rivals’ maneuvering in Somalia, their growing interest in the Horn of Africa
has also affected dynamics between countries in the region. Unlike in other regions of the
continent, there have been no real attempts by Horn of Africa countries to organize as a
cooperative bloc with mutual security, economic, or geostrategic interests. This has left the
region vulnerable to shocks emanating from outside the region, such as the Gulf states and
broader Middle East.
1 Harun Maruf, “Turkey Gives Weapons to Somali Soldiers,” Voice of America, January 5, 2018.
Beyond the Gulf rivals’ maneuvering in Somalia, their
growing interest in the Horn of Africa has also affected
dynamics between countries in the region.
Taimur Khan | 3
Sudan’s leasing of the island of Suakin to Turkey in December 2017 set in motion a chain
of events that brought Sudan and Egypt to the brink of conflict. Meanwhile, the UAE and
Saudi Arabia’s use of Eritrean military bases to conduct operations in Yemen threatened a
response from the Horn of Africa’s most powerful country, Ethiopia. According to one expert,
“the impact of the [Gulf Cooperation Council] split and the Yemen war was seen as a divider
and a source of insecurity for the Horn of Africa states.”
However, recent developments spurred by the historic peace deal between Ethiopia and
Eritrea – which was partly brokered by the UAE – have altered the frame through which
Gulf engagement is viewed. The potential for substantial negative effects remains, but it is
increasingly clear that the Gulf Arab states can play a positive role. “The conventional narrative
is a deeply pessimistic one, that [Gulf involvement] would be a driver of conflict,” one expert
said. “But movement on the Eritrea-Ethiopia issue gets at the ways in which these recent
dynamics might be a driver of conflict resolution in ways I couldn’t have imagined” even
very recently. The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict had spilled across the region in a variety of ways,
inflaming tensions between Eritrea and Sudan and Ethiopia and Egypt, as well as troubling
Sudan’s relations with Cairo, and Djibouti’s ties with Eritrea. “A major conflict axis in the region
[has been taken] off the table and that is very significant,” the expert said.
A History of Gulf Engagement
Since the postcolonial era of the 1950s and 60s there has been a record of Gulf countries
engaging in the Horn of Africa to pursue mostly political objectives. While there are similarities
between the recent engagement and relationships in the past, there are also significant
differences. “Arab states have had a lot of influence in the Horn historically, [and] their
rivalries have spilled over in repeated intervals,” one expert said. “The Arab-Israeli rivalry, the
rivalry between conservative and radical states, even between Baathist states, have driven
conflict. The long conflict in Sudan, the civil war in Ethiopia, the Ethiopia-Somalia war all had a
dimension of Middle East rivalries spilling over into the Horn.”
The last high-water mark of involvement was during the Cold War, particularly the 1970s
and 80s when the Gulf monarchies had large budget surpluses to spend pursuing interests
abroad. At the time, Gulf countries mostly aligned with the United States against Soviet-backed
movements and governments, which was reflected in their engagement in the Horn of Africa.
“For instance, what Saudi [Arabia] was doing in Ethiopia after the Marxist revolution was in
lockstep with U.S. containment and supporting certain elements of the Eritrean rebels,” one
expert noted. “It’s a different story now.” The Gulf Arab powers and Turkey – all putative close
and historic U.S. partners – are currently pursuing their own perceived interests, sometimes
explicitly out of competition with each other, many times in ways that clash with U.S. interests
or that support U.S. rivals like China and Russia. At other times the dynamic is reversed, and
U.S. interests are bolstered at the expense of the United States’ competitors. “There’s no
button one can press in Washington, Moscow, or Beijing to get control of what’s going on in
the Horn of Africa. It’s a far messier game,” the expert said.
Another shift that signals this cycle of Gulf engagement in the Horn of Africa may be more
sustained and longer term is the establishment of permanent strategic commercial and
military assets along the Horn of Africa’s Red Sea coast. The UAE has led the way in this,
Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa | 4
with a military and naval base in Assab, Eritrea. These were followed by a military and naval
base in Berbera, Somaliland as well as a port run by the Dubai-based DP World and a related
free zone and connectivity infrastructure. Additionally, the Dubai-based P&O Ports took over
the management of the port of Bosaso, in the semiautonomous Somali state of Puntland,
where the UAE has trained a Puntland maritime force to counter piracy and fight al-Shabab.
Saudi Arabia has a military facility in Djibouti. Turkey has a base in Mogadishu and Albayrak
company – whose chairman is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law – runs
the Mogadishu port. Ankara also has signed a long-term concession to rebuild and manage
the Ottoman port of Suakin, Sudan, although it is still unclear if this will have military or solely
commercial dimensions.
Growing Global and Regional Competition in the Red
Sea
Deepening Gulf engagement in the Horn of Africa also coincides with – and is shaped by –
growing interest in the region’s strategic geography, and its economic potential, by global
powers and medium-sized powers such as western European Union countries and Israel. This
intense interest has given far greater leverage to Horn of Africa leaders to bargain for better
deals or play patrons off one another. The Gulf countries’ new position in the Horn of Africa
also allows them to leverage their role as larger global powers jockey for position.
China is increasing its focus on the region and Red Sea, and Russia, which is already exploiting
openings left by the United States and European powers elsewhere in Africa, is actively
looking for a Horn of Africa country in which it can build its own military facilities. The UAE, in
particular, may hope that its influence and hard assets in the Horn of Africa position it to act
as a regional partner for these powers as
it also pursues its own interests. It seems
as though China, the United States, and
Russia are avoiding forcing the UAE to take
sides and are pursuing alignments when
practical. For example, the UAE is at odds
with Djibouti over the nationalization of
the Doraleh Container Terminal that DP
World had run in Djibouti. A Chinese state
firm was given control of an area around the terminal to build Africa’s largest free-trade zone,
and China has built an even bigger port at Doraleh. The United States is increasingly alarmed
over the widening scope of Djibouti’s ties to Beijing, and the strategic risk of Chinese control
over Djiboutian ports that service the largest U.S. military base in Africa, also in Djibouti. One
expert suggested that U.S. support for the UAE’s efforts to mediate Eritrea-Ethiopia peace
is tied to the Djibouti issue, as it looks to diversify its footprint away from Djibouti, possibly
to Assab, creating an area of alignment between Abu Dhabi and Washington. But this has
not seemed to dampen the China-UAE relationship elsewhere, with Chinese President Xi
Jinping making a state visit to Abu Dhabi in late July during which a number of pledges of
The Gulf Arab powers and Turkey – all putative close
and historic U.S. partners – are currently pursuing
their own perceived interests, sometimes explicitly out
of competition with each other, many times in ways
that clash with U.S. interests or that support U.S. rivals
like China and Russia.
Taimur Khan | 5
cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative were announced. These included a DP World
agreement with Zhejiang China Commodities City Group to build a Traders Market in the Jebel
Ali free zone.2
Horn of Africa countries are also making the most of their newfound strategic importance
increasingly playing global powers off each other or simply balancing relations, even between
rival countries. For the first year of the dispute with Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia appeared
to give zero-sum options to their Horn of Africa partners, but that position seems to have
softened over time and as these countries’ own leverage has increased. For example, Sudan
has leveraged its current position as an important partner for not only Gulf countries, but
also the EU, the United States, Israel, and Ethiopia. The government of Sudanese President
Omar Bashir has been able to, for now, solidify its survival after a period of pariah status. One
expert described recent meetings with current and former officials in the Sudanese capital of
Khartoum, and a clear desire to re-evaluate Sudan’s role in the Yemen conflict as a key supplier
of soldiers to the Saudi-led coalition. Around 16,000 Sudanese troops have been deployed to
Yemen as part of the coalition, an expert stated. “The discussion was very engaged in terms
of do we really want to continue in the war in Yemen, because of domestic concerns, because
2 “DP World Signs Agreement to Boost International Trade,” DP World, July 19, 2018.
Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa | 6
more and more people are wondering where is the money that our troops were supposed to
be receiving” from the coalition. Domestically, Khartoum’s siding with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi
against Qatar as well as Iran has been criticized widely in a country where Islamist political
groups that have a long history of ties to post-revolution Iran and Qatar are popular. There are
also deep concerns in Khartoum about potential domestic blowback when the battle-hardened
forces return home. Some of the Sudanese soldiers are drawn from militias affiliated with
tribal leaders in Darfur, where Arab tribes are currently in conflict over resources and territory.
“They are coming back with more equipment, knowledge, and money,” an expert said. “What
are the implications in this region of the war in Yemen?” Beyond the growing number of
questions over the necessity of involvement in Yemen, Khartoum’s importance as a partner
for regional and global powers has increased significantly since the migration wave from Africa
that has had outsized political ramifications in Europe, in particular. For EU countries, Sudan
has become a focal point for cooperation
on stemming migration from the Horn
of Africa, and more broadly the security
nexus between the Horn of Africa and
Sahel region. For Washington, Khartoum
has become an important counterterrorism partner. Sudan has also aligned with Ethiopia
on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam since it received guarantees of water volumes
for agriculture. Gulf countries are returning to the view that Sudan can be key to their food
security, providing greater confidence to Ethiopia and Sudan. “This has brought Sudan into a
very strong position,” according to one expert.
Another recent development, in Somalia, underscores the increasing confidence in hedging
and balancing among Horn of Africa actors. Soon after he met with the Abu Dhabi crown prince
in June, Ethiopia’s reformist President Ahmed Abiy traveled to Mogadishu for unexpected talks
with Somalia’s president. The Farmajo government is closely aligned with Qatar and Turkey;
its relations with Abu Dhabi have broken down completely as a result of these ties, which
Abu Dhabi sees as undermining its influence and interests in Mogadishu, as well as the UAE’s
engagement with Somali federal member states, which strengthens the autonomy-seeking
leaders of those regions and weakens Mogadishu’s sovereignty. Farmajo’s government has
empowered Islamist groups, and has sought to use its patrons’ financial support to try and
undermine the federal states and concentrate power in Mogadishu.
It was a shock, then, when Abiy and Farmajo announced the signing of a joint communique
that committed to greater economic and political integration between Somalia and Ethiopia,
including the joint development of four Somali commercial ports. There has been little
clarification about this potentially momentous agreement, but Somali analysts and members
of parliament say that Abiy may have convinced Farmajo to drop his opposition to the UAE’s
port and military projects in Somaliland and Puntland. A source close to Somali Prime Minister
Hassan Ali Khayre said that Farmajo has decided to balance his government’s relations with
Qatar and the UAE. He added that there may be a concern that there is less incentive for Doha
to maintain the same level of support if there is no threat of competition. That would be a
major accomplishment for Abu Dhabi, which, according to accounts of former and current
Somali officials as well as opposition lawmakers, had lost any levers of influence it had in
Mogadishu after a handful of key allies were disempowered by Farmajo, and the UAE had not
cultivated clan or other networks in Mogadishu beyond those figures.
Sudan has leveraged its current position as an
important partner for not only Gulf countries, but also
the EU, the United States, Israel, and Ethiopia.
Taimur Khan | 7
There would be, notionally, a number of benefits for Farmajo in being courted by Ethiopia, and
by extension the UAE. “The Ethiopians went there saying there’s a lot of change happening, we
will try to balance with the [federal member states] but you have to accept this deal and we will
also talk to the UAE so that there is a fit that can be found for everyone,” another source close
to the current government said. It is also likely that Farmajo’s calculations are being influenced
by the Horn of Africa’s shifting geopolitics, which are for now tilting heavily in Ethiopia’s favor.
If Abiy is able to finally work with Eritrea, Sudan, and Kenya on greater regional integration,
and is allied with the UAE and backed strongly by the United States, European countries, and
the African Union, then an intransigent Farmajo would be squeezed externally and internally,
if the federal member states were emboldened and able to successfully resist his centralizing
strategy.
In the months since Abiy’s Mogadishu trip, he and Farmajo have met a number of times, but it
remains unclear if the dynamics in Mogadishu have shifted or if the UAE is content for now to,
in essence, let Qatar “own” the dysfunction and deteriorating security situation. Farmajo’s chief
of staff, Fahad Yasin, who is widely seen as the conduit for Qatari support, was named deputy
director of the internal intelligence service in August. The move was read by many analysts
as tied to an alleged campaign by Mogadishu to undermine federal member state presidents
allied with the UAE and Ethiopia ahead
of a slate of state elections over the next
year.
While the UAE’s partnership with
Ethiopia has had stabilizing externalities,
the case of Sudan illustrates how Gulf
engagement can be a driver of conflict in unpredictable ways, especially when the capabilities
and resources between Gulf Arab and Horn of Africa countries are so lopsided. “It’s a region
where security dilemmas are acute and concerns about regime survival are endemic,” an
expert said. “You put new external bases and new alliances into that equation, [they are]
potentially transformative in terms of the balance of power. So, this creates a lot of risk and
perceived vulnerability among states in the region and creates real potential for crisis and
escalation even if no one is angling for conflict.”
The scope and scale of military engagement by Gulf countries with their Horn of Africa clients
is almost completely opaque, which can also fuel the risk and threat perceptions of others.
Political rivalries in the region can be deeply rooted and may not have the same potential for
resolution as the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement. The countries were bitter enemies, but the
people of both share language, ethnicity, history, and culture. The societal desire for peace
was strong, and just needed a catalyst at the elite level to achieve it. But the dynamic is flipped
in Somalia, for example, where the joint agreement for greater integration with Ethiopia was
met by widespread grassroots condemnation that caught Farmajo’s government off guard.
The scope and scale of military engagement by Gulf
countries with their Horn of Africa clients is almost
completely opaque, which can also fuel the risk and
threat perceptions of others.
Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa | 8
Implications for Governance and Leadership
Transitions
Greater Gulf engagement in the Horn of Africa also has important implications for the
deeper structural evolution of governance in the region. The UAE’s opening with Ethiopia
was produced by a crisis of politics and governance in Ethiopia. The Tigray minority’s grip on
political and economic power became unsustainable and pushed Ethiopia to the brink of a
civil unraveling. The state’s single party, dominated by the Tigray fighters that overthrew the
Marxist dictatorship in 1991, allowed Abiy to become prime minister and has allowed his deep
pro-democratization reforms to proceed, so far. The country’s next general elections are in
less than two years and will be profoundly important. How Ethiopia’s transition plays out –
and how Gulf states decide to engage with it politically – will have implications for the entire
Horn of Africa, where political systems are almost all in some state of generational or societal
transition. In Eritrea, Sudan, and Djibouti, leaders are aging and there are no clear successors
or institutionalized systems of succession or transition. “What’s happening in Ethiopia is not
just about Ethiopia, it has regional implications. It is the political and economic center of
gravity of the Horn and it will have a democracy dividend beyond its borders, particularly in
neighboring countries,” one expert said. “I have a difficult time imagining how the autocratic
states bordering Ethiopia will be able to sustain their models over time if Ethiopia gets this
transition right.” That transition looks more and more troubled, as violence between ethnic
groups in the eastern Oromo and Somali regions of Ethiopia erupted in August.
Alternatively, Gulf engagement with leaders and other individual elites could produce what an
expert called a “countervailing force” that undermines the process of governance reform that
is key to regional stability. Leaders in the Horn of Africa may seek to use their new alliances in
the Gulf to extract political and economic rents that can be used to prolong their rule and ward
off pressure from below to reform governance along more democratic or at least inclusive
and representative lines.
A Story of Declining U.S. Influence, Real or Perceived
The story of greater Gulf and Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa is also one of an attendant
decline in influence on the part of Washington and EU powers. “A few things are happening
at the same time,” an expert said. “We have the emergence of the UAE, with a burgeoning
appetite for regional and geostrategic influence, and that’s happening because of and at
the same time as a growing feeling that the U.S. is intrinsically stepping back. The pivot to
Asia is taken desperately literally … [and has] galvanized what we’re seeing in the region.”
The United States seems almost solely concerned with the Horn of Africa as a security and
counterterrorism issue, and perhaps some aspects such as the Red Sea maritime corridor and
chokepoint as a small part of its larger competition with China and Russia.
Western countries do not appear to have longer-term economic strategies or to be interested in
engaging widely in Horn of Africa societies and politics to try and influence political outcomes.
U.S. officials, however, point to Washington’s role in the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and
the influence the United States wields through security relationships. European officials in
the Horn of Africa say that they are actually increasing their focus on the region, as a result of
Taimur Khan | 9
the migration issue, primarily. According to one expert, given the strategic importance of the
Bab el-Mandeb for European trade, the EU is working to convene a Red Sea forum with Horn
of Africa countries, the United States, Gulf countries, and other international stakeholders.
But the geopolitics creates questions about the effectiveness of such a multilateral forum in
managing so many competing interests. “The Germans have an interest to lead, and there
are discussions with Norwegians right now on this … the question is who has the convening
power and who is interested in joining,” an expert said. “Everybody is cautious to not bring
the problem from that Gulf to this Gulf. Iran won’t be invited to this first round, but everyone
has others like Turkey and China on their mind when talking about the Red Sea.” Western
officials in the Horn of Africa also point to the pre-arrears clearance funding from the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the $100 million in additional budgetary support
the EU will give to Mogadishu that they say will give the Somali government the ability to resist
political pressure from Gulf countries. But on the ground, the view is quite different. Western
frustration with the slow pace of governance reform and security sector capabilities by the
Somali central government is underscored by a sense that they are taking on the messiest
problems with little to show for the effort.
This dynamic is occurring as pivotal moments of transition are on the horizon for a number of
Horn of Africa countries. The most fragile, Somalia, is scheduled to have African Union troops
that have been key to securing at least some modicum of security withdraw in 2020. Turkey,
rather than the United States or EU, has taken on the task of training Somali National Army
troops to take over from the African Union force. But the army is still deeply fractured by clan
loyalties and riven with corruption, and
there is little hope that it can be turned
into a competent security force in such a
short time.
A U.N. official admitted that compared to
just a few years ago, Western influence
in Somali politics has faded markedly.
During the initial stages of the Gulf dispute spilling over into Somalia, a U.S. official said
that they received no response from Gulf counterparts to requests to discuss the political
situation. Political elites in Mogadishu in the early summer were preoccupied with navigating
relationships with the Gulf and Turkey, and how to normalize the relationship with the UAE, or,
for opposition members, how to engage the UAE to their benefit. “If you look at the ports and
[support for the] central government it is Turkey. After the Europeans couldn’t find a common
idea of how to train the [Somali National Army] it is Turkey doing it. So, Turkey’s influence
militarily is massive. It is much more important than anyone else’s, including the U.S.,” one
expert said. “This is a long-term investment and is not just there for military cooperation.”
Understudied Role of Israel
Another U.S. regional ally that is beginning to play a larger role in the Horn of Africa is Israel.
Tel Aviv has longstanding ties to Eritrea and Ethiopia, is engaged in South Sudan and with
Khartoum, is close to Egypt, and has an increasingly visible relationship with the UAE, Saudi
Arabia, and even Qatar. A less-known area of coordination between Israel and these Gulf
countries in Washington was the push to rehabilitate Sudanese President Omar Bashir,
How Ethiopia’s transition plays out – and how Gulf
states decide to engage with it politically – will have
implications for the entire Horn of Africa, where
political systems are almost all in some state of
generational or societal transition.
Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa | 10
according to one expert. Israel is keen to help Sudan with technical water management issues
that will arise from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in both Sudan and Egypt. If the
Gulf countries and Sudan attempt to create a “bread basket” in Sudan that is successful – a
previous attempt in the 1970s failed – Israel’s technical expertise will be important, an expert
noted. Tel Aviv also has pushed for the lifting of U.N. sanctions and the reintegration of Eritrea
as a Western partner, based on close security relations with the country but also because of
an Eritrean refugee problem that the Israeli administration is eager to solve, according to one
expert. “Israel has an increased position in most of the Horn countries, including Sudan. It’s
not the time to be anti-Israel even in Sudan anymore,” an expert said. “There is a huge change
in this respect.”
Russia’s Bid for Influence
Russia is another country eager to join the scramble for influence in the Red Sea basin. An expert
said that at the recent Valdai Discussion Club annual foreign policy forum in St. Petersburg there
was a focus on the region and where Moscow might seek a permanent military base. “Maybe
Suakin, maybe Egypt,” the expert added. “There was talk about the fact of the attractiveness
of working with the UAE in reviving the Aden port in southern Yemen. What bothers them is
all these little countries getting these facilities and great Russia isn’t.” A former Somaliland
government official said that in late 2017 a delegation from the previous administration was
taken on a trip to Russia. The first stop
was Chechnya, where they talked with
counterparts about areas of potential
cooperation on agricultural production,
promoting moderate Islam, and
education. Then they met with officials
at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow to talk about Horn of Africa politics. The issue of military
bases was raised, with the Russians interested in Berbera, unhappy that the UAE had already
been granted a base there, the former official said. Another potential site discussed was the
Somaliland port of Zeila, near the border with Djibouti, the former official added.
Abu Dhabi and Moscow have been cooperating across Africa, and the UAE would be an
attractive partner for Russia in the Red Sea. According to one expert, Russia and the UAE are
“already working in tandem on the Central African file.” Russia has 170 military trainers in the
Central African Republic and has imported a significant number of arms through Sudan to
equip the forces it is helping train. “That has led to conversations in [the Democratic Republic
of the Congo] and Rwanda” for Russian security support. The UAE has engaged with these
countries in Central and Eastern Africa on infrastructure development and commercial
investments. Russia also appears interested in extracting raw commodities in Africa, including
in Libya, where Moscow is deeply involved.
Gulf Economic Policies
The Gulf countries’ engagement with the Horn of Africa through military partnerships and
political alliances has been made possible by a form of economic foreign policy that they
have deployed with increasing sophistication since 2011 as they seek to extend their reach
Western countries do not appear to have longer-term
economic strategies or to be interested in engaging
widely in Horn of Africa societies and politics to try and
influence political outcomes.
Taimur Khan | 11
and influence. Karen Young has described these newer forms of economic foreign policy,
which are still being tested and are evolving, as “economic statecraft.”3 Rather than a foreign
policy intended to produce primarily economic gains, economic statecraft models seek to use
economic leverage to serve strategic political and military policy goals as well as economic
interests. The unique political economies of the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia mean that
the interests of the state, ruling families and important business families, and investment
entities and commercial enterprises are intertwined. This makes it difficult to pinpoint the
dividing lines between strategic interests of the state and economic interests, or whether
commercial initiatives and investments are made primarily for a return on investment or
for other objectives. In the Horn of Africa, these questions have been particularly difficult
to unpack because there is little data available from either side. One expert described the
Horn of Africa as a laboratory for this model of Gulf political economy: Is the Horn of Africa
an arena for strategic competition and rivalry, or will the promises of investment in sectors
such as agriculture and infrastructure reap economic benefits for Horn of Africa countries and
Gulf investors? It remains to be seen whether lessons learned in previous attempts at post-
2011 economic statecraft, such as in the case of Egypt, can be applied to similar engagement
in the Horn of Africa. Gulf officials may say that they can adapt and be reactive, “There isn’t
a long-term strategy and there is a real weakness about the deployment of human capital,”
one expert said. “Who is able to do this work and be the advisor? So [that’s why] you get the
transactional diplomacy with not a lot of follow up,” leading to insulated and experimental
policies. The expert continued, “The asset in this is that it can change direction very quickly,
but the consequences are all the more unsteady.”
So far, not much has materialized amid all of the talk of complementary economic interests,
according to one expert. Agricultural investments by the Gulf countries in the past have simply
not paid off commercially or in terms of actually providing strategic food security. Qatar
is already looking elsewhere – the United States, India, Brazil – after a failure to realize its
agricultural investment goals in Sudan and Ethiopia. The United States has spent billions in
aid dollars to maintain food security for vulnerable populations in the Horn of Africa, where
many regions, like eastern Ethiopia, are food insecure. The politics around land use in Ethiopia
are likely to grow more complicated as the Abiy government tries to liberalize and reform land
regulations; 85 percent of Ethiopians are subsistence farmers on public lands and deregulation
will be a politically explosive issue. Protests that grew and spun out of control in 2015 led
directly to Abiy’s rise to prime minister, and one expert questioned whether there is a viable
model for agricultural investments by Gulf countries in Ethiopia. Ethiopia and other Horn of
Africa countries all have large youth bulges and fast-growing populations – dynamics that will
add to stressors around liberal land policies and a stated shift to industrial production.
It is still not clear how economic aspirations are being calibrated with the Gulf states’ political
and security goals. Is Abu Dhabi really clear about the economic dividend its partnership with
Ethiopia can bring, or is it primarily about weakening Turkey’s position and outmaneuvering
Qatar? A clear economic statecraft strategy has yet to emerge, although the complementarities
between the economic objectives of the UAE and Ethiopia are numerous. Ongoing high-level
visits between Emirati officials – led by Reem Al Hashimy, the minister of state for international
3 Karen E. Young, “The Interventionist Turn in Gulf States’ Foreign Policies,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June
1, 2016.
Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa | 12
cooperation – and Ethiopian counterparts have outlined areas where investments will be
made. The UAE is looking for opportunities to invest in sectors such as logistics, real estate,
and financing as part of its strategy to reduce its reliance on oil revenue. Ethiopia is desperate
for foreign investment in such areas so that it can pursue its own industrialization strategy to
reduce Ethiopians’ reliance on small-scale agriculture. A key to unlocking this mutual potential
is ending Ethiopia’s sole dependence on the port of Djibouti, where exorbitant fees hobble
Ethiopia’s economic potential and contribute to its balance of payments crisis. The UAE,
through Dubai’s private DP World port operations and logistics company, has co-invested with
Ethiopia in the port of Berbera. After Hashimy and Abiy met in August, it was announced that
the UAE would build an oil pipeline connecting Ethiopia with Eritrea’s Assab port, another
element of ending Addis Ababa’s strategic reliance on Djibouti.
Greater port access is the key foreign-policy goal of the Abiy administration, and it is in talks
about joint investments in ports from Kenya to Somalia and Sudan. Until now, Chinese banks
have provided financing for large infrastructure projects in Ethiopia, but Addis Ababa has
been unable to pay back loans, and as a result its relationship with China had been souring.
The Abiy administration likely hopes that Emirati investments can make up the balance, and
that they may also force China to rethink its position. “The Chinese have turned off the tap to
Ethiopia; they think they’re over leveraged,” an expert said. “You can explain a lot about UAE
ties [to Ethiopia] through the worsening
ties with China. They feel Ethiopia doesn’t
make commercial sense for them”
anymore. Berbera might be a first test
case for Emirati-Ethiopian cooperation
on ports, and how the labor of financing
and building infrastructure is divided. So
far development and investment in the port has been slow, at best, although DP World and
the Somaliland government held a groundbreaking ceremony on the extension of the Berbera
port quay and a free zone around the port on October 11.4
This nascent model led by the UAE stands in contrast to that of China, which has been engaged
in the Horn of Africa on a much larger scale and for longer than the Gulf countries. China’s
long-term interests are clear, in the form of its Belt and Road Initiative that seeks to link Asia
to Africa and Europe through Chinese-financed infrastructure, and that Beijing is betting will
cement its status as the world’s next superpower. The Belt and Road Initiative also seeks
to create opportunities for Chinese excess labor and banks, rather than possessing merely
political or military objectives, which has also created resentments in the Horn of Africa and
opportunities for other outside powers. In many ways, one expert said, China is strategically
at odds with the United States, EU, and even the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa. The Chinesefunded
economic free zone around the new Chinese-built port facility in Djibouti is already
coming online, whereas similar Gulf-backed projects like Berbera have languished. The scale
of the financial and human capital China wields cannot be matched by other players. In other
ways, however, Beijing values the role that the UAE in particular can play as an important
regional cog in the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to leverage its position in the region as a
logistical and soft infrastructure hub. This was underscored by the Chinese president’s visit
4 “DP World Berbera Port Development Work Begins,” Emirates News Agency, October 11, 2018.
It remains to be seen whether lessons learned in
previous attempts at post-2011 economic statecraft,
such as in the case of Egypt, can be applied to similar
engagement in the Horn of Africa.
Taimur Khan | 13
to Abu Dhabi in July, when a number of announcements were made stressing the desire of
the UAE and China to cooperate on the Belt and Road Initiative and establishing trade and
investment partnerships.5
Conclusion
Perhaps the Berbera port project is an apt metaphor for Gulf countries’ push to become
permanent players in the Horn of Africa. Fallout in neighboring Djibouti due to an internecine
fight within the ruling clique over resources forced DP World to quickly find an alternative that
would allow it to continue pursuing its goals in east Africa. This led to a broader engagement
in Somaliland that has also been complicated by local politics, and the construction of a
nearby UAE military base. The project has been fortuitously bolstered by regional dynamics
centered on Ethiopia but also mired in the complexities of local issues such as clan dynamics
and elite competition for rents. While the scale of the project holds promise to transform
Somaliland and maybe even pave the way for the fulfillment of the breakaway region’s dreams
of statehood recognition, the potential
for huge profits also exposes the ways in
which it could feed into and exacerbate
corruption and destabilizing politics.
If Berbera becomes a major alternative
port for Ethiopia, it could also unlock
huge regional potential. On the other hand, the military dimensions of the broader UAE
engagement could contribute to a greater militarization of the Red Sea region and contribute
to insecurity. Like the larger economic, political, and security role Gulf countries are hoping to
play in the Horn of Africa, Berbera’s potential is still on paper only. Will the current grand bet
on the economic potential of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa pay off, or as in previous eras,
will internal politics and structural social problems bedevil Gulf plans? In the end, will they be
able to compete with the scale of resources and influence that China wields?
So far, questions far outweigh answers. But it is unquestionable that Gulf countries’ new roles
in the Horn of Africa are redefining the region’s dynamics in a way that they have never before.
As the geopolitics of the Red Sea region moves into an era of multipolarity, Gulf influence will
be a central and unavoidable factor.
5 Nick Webster, “UAE and China Declare Deep Strategic Partnership as State Visit Ends,” The National, modified August
12, 2018.
Greater port access is the key foreign-policy goal of
the Abiy administration, and it is in talks about joint
investments in ports from Kenya to Somalia and
Sudan.
www.agsiw.org
Shirkadda Dahabshiil oo ka Qayb...
Shirkadda Dahabshiil oo ka Qayb Qaadatay Carwadda Ganacsiga Somaliland.
Madaxweyne Farmaajo oo dhagax dhigay...
 
Madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya Mudane Maxamed Cabdullaahi Farmaajo ayaa maanta dhagax dhigay dib-u-dhiska Xarunta Madxafka Qaranka oo ka mid ah goobaha danta guud ee dib loogu dhisayo Barnaamijka Isxilqaan.
Madaxweynaha ayaa mar kale ku celiyay in dadka Soomaaliyeed aysan sugin gacmo shisheeye oo u dhisa dalkooda ee taas baddalkeeda ay isku tashadaan, una istaagaan ka qayb qaadashada barnaamijkan isxilqaanka ah.
Madaxweynaha ayaa tilmaamay in fekerka Isxilqaan uu hadda ficil isu baddalay oo Madaxfka Qaranku uu yahay xaruntii labaad oo shaqada dhismuhu ka bilaabatay, iyadoona dib-u-dhiska Tiyaatarku uu meel wanaagsan marayo.
“Bacdamaa ay guul ahayd in aan bilownay shaqada dib-u-dhiska Tiyaatarka Qaranka, waxaan ku xejineynaa Madxafka, Maktabadda Qaranka iyo xarumo badan oo dowladdu leedahay, kuwaas oo ay ka mid yihiin goobo waxbarasho iyo kuwo caafimaad.”
Madaxweyne Maxamed Cabdullaahi Farmaajo ayaa u mahadceliyay dhammaan shacabka iyo mas’uuliyiinta dowladda ee ay ka go’an tahay in ay maskax, maal iyo muruqba ku bixiyaan Ololaha Isxilqaan.
Guddoomiyaha Guddiga dhismaha Madxafka Qaranka ahna Wasiirka Boostada iyo Isgaarsiinta Xukuumadda Federaalka Soomaaliya Mudane Cabdi Cashuur Xasan ayaa sheegay in ay diyaariyeen qorshe dib-u-dhiska Madxafka Qaranka lagu dhammaystirayo sanadka soo socda.
 

Madaxwayne Farmaajo oo Dhagax dhigay...
Madaxwayne Farmaajo oo Dhagax dhigay Madxafka Qaranka.
Aqriso marxaladihii uu soo maray...

Shabakadda taleefannada gacanta ee adduunku waxa ay soo martay jid dheer; waxa ay dunidu hadda ka sii gudbaysaa shabakadda jiilka Afaraad (4G) oo la sugayo in sannadka foodda innagu soo haya ee 2019 ka loo gudbo jiilka shanaad ee 5G. Waxaana horumar weyn laga sameeyey samaynta qalab awood u leh in uu sii wanaajiyo isgaadhsiinta.
Haddaba Afrika oo maanta lagu tiriiyo meelaha horumarka uu ka socdo horumarka ugu ballaadha nee arrintan la xidhiidha, ayaanay dad badani ogeyn in dalkii ugu horreeyey ee talefanka gacanta lagaga hadlay uu ahaa dalka Jamhuuriyadda Dimuqraaddiga ah ee Koongo.
Qofkii ugu horreeyey Afrika ee shabakadda taleefanka gacanta isticmaalaa waxa uu ahaa Miko Rwayitare, oo ah maalqabeen u dhashay dalka Rwanda. Waxa uu dhashay bishii labaad ee 1942 kii, dalkiisa oo markaas la odhan jiray Zaire ayaa uu ku qaatay waxbarashadii dugsiga hoose iyo sare. Kaddib dalka Jarmalka ayaa uu tegey, waxa aanu cilmiga Injineeriyadda ku soo qaatay jaamacadda dalkaas ku taalla ee Karlsruhe sannadkii 1970 kii.
Markii uu Jarmalka ka soo noqday waxa uu u shaqeeyey shirkado kala duwan, laakhirkii waxa uu qaatay go’aan ah in uu isagu shaqo sameeyo oo uu maalgashi la yimaaddo. Waxa uu aad uga calool xumaaday taleefannadii laynka ahaa ee dalka oo uu markaas ka talinayey Kelitaliyihii Mabutu Sese Seko, waxa aanu go’aansaday in uu raadiyo xal wax lagaga qaban karo internet ka dalka oo aad u daciif ahaa.
Miko waxa uu aasaasay shirkadda Telecel International, oo taariikhda u gashay in ay tahay sirkaddii isgaadhsiinta taleefananda gacanta ah ee ugu horreysay. Markii uu Miko go’aansaday in uu shirkaddan furo waxa uu taageero ka raadsaday Josep Gatt, oo ahaa muwaadin Maraykan ah oo ahaa agaasimaha fulinta ee shirkadda duulimaadyada Pan-American Airlines, xafiiskeeda Zaire, horena uga shaqayn jiray shirkadda duulimaadyada ee dalka Zaire oo imika loo yaqaanno jamhuuriyadda dimuqraaddiga ah ee Koongo. Gatt waxa uu lahaa xidhiidho badan oo Miko u baahnaa si qorshihiisu u guulaysto.
Booqasho uu sannadkii 1985 kii, madaxweynihii Zaire Mobuttu ku tegey Maraykanka ayaa iyaduna Miko u noqotay fursad uu ku helo dhiirrigelintii uu u baahnaa. Waxa uu ka shaqeeyey in Madaxweyne Mobuttu loo dhiibo taleefanka gacanta ee shirkadda Motorola soo saari jirtay oo markaas ahaa mid aad u culus oo xabbad jaajuur ah la moodo, waxa aanu madaxweynuhu kula soo hadlay dadkiisa joogay Kinshasa caasimadda Kongo.
“Waxa aanu taleefanno u diyaarinnay Mobutu iyo toban ka mid ah gacanyareyaashiisa. Waxa ay ahaayeen taleefanno sida jaajuurka ah. Dhib ayaanu ka mudannay sidii aanu gacanyareyaasha uga dhaadhicin lahayn in waxan aanu u dhiibnay aanu la mid ahayn fooniyaha gacanta ee Walkie-Talkie, ee uu taleefan run ah yahay. Cabsi badan ayaa ka haysay in ay taleefan dibadda ah ku hadlaan. Waxa aanu tusnay sida ay u isticmaalayaan. Waxaana mahad Alle ah in ay noo shaqaysay, waayo markaas weli tiknoolajiyaddu curdin ayaa ay ku ahayd dalka Maraykanka. Laakiin waa ay noo shaqaysay, Mobuto waxa uu awooday in Isaga oo Maraykan jooga uu taleefanka kala soo hadlo gacanyareyaashiisa joogay qasriga madaxtooyada ee Kinshasa.” Ayaa uu yidhi Josep Gatt oo ka warramayey qisada bilowgii isticmaalak taleefanka gacanta ee Afrika. Waxa aanu intaas ku sii daray in markii madaxweyne Mobuto uu isticmaalay taleefanka gacanta uu aad uga helay, bilaabayna in uu dhiirrigeliyo fikirka ah in dalkiisa laga hirgeliyo adeegga isgaadhsiitna ee taleefanka gacanta.
Miko Rwayitare sidaas ayaa uu ku bilaabay aasaaska shirkaddiisa oo uu iskaashi kala sameeyey Gatt, waxa uu iibsaday shirkad isgaadhsiinta taleefanka gacanta ahayd oo Maraykanka laga lahaa, qalabkaas iyo farsamadaas ayaanu bilow uga dhigay shirkadda cusub oo uu u bixiyey Telecel. Waxaa si dhaqso ah wax looga beddelay xeerarkii isgaadhsiitna dalka Zaire si loo fasaxo furashada shirkado isgaadhsiineed oo gaar loo leeyahay, taas oo ahayd sida keliya ee sharci lagu siin karayey shirkadda Telecel.
Shirkadda Telecel waxa ay markii ugu horreysay shaqada si rasmi ah u bilowday sannadkii 1987 kii, markii dhismaheeda la dhammaystirayna Miko Rwayitare ayaa noqday qofkii ugu horreeyey ee isaga oo qaaradda Afrika jooga taleefanka gacanta kula hadlay cid kale. Waxaa xusid mudan in madaxweyne Mobuto isagu marka uu taleefanka gacanta ku soo hadlayey uu joogay Maraykanka, gacanyareyaashiisa qasriga joogay ee uu la soo hadlayna ay Khadka xadhiga ah ee caadiga ah isticmaalayeen.
Sannadkii koowaad dadka taleefannada gacanta qaatay waxa ay noqdeen 3 kun waxa aanu adeegga taleefanka gacantu ku koobnaa caasimadda,
Miko Rwayitare waxa uu dhintay bishii sagaalaad ee sannadkii 2007, kaddib markii uu ka kici waayey qalniin fudud oo uu ku galay magaalada Brussels ee dalka Belgium ka. Waxa uu weli ahaa guddoomiya sare iyo agaasimaah fulinta ee shirkaddii uu aasaasay ee Telecel.
Wareegto Muuse Biixi lama furi karo...
Wararka aan ka heleyno Somaliland ayaa sheegaya in Xukuumada Madaxweyne Muuse Biixi Cabdi ay soo saartay amar ka dhan ah Iskuulada sida gaarka ah loo leeyahay ee aanan gacanta Somaliland ku jirin.
Aamarkaani kasooo baxay Wasaaradda waxbarashada Somaliland aya ah in wax ruqsad ah ama ogolaasho la siin karin ilaa amar dambe dadka doonaya in ay furtaan Iskuullo hor leh oo gaar loo leeyhay, sidaas si lamid ahna aanan iskuulada jira ee gaarka loo leeyahay aanan loo ogaleyn in ay furtaan xarumo cusub oo ay isku balaarinayaan.Halkaan hoose ka akhriso warka kasoo baxay Somaliland ee lagu amray in aanan la furi karin iskuullo gaar loo leeyahay.
Ganacsade guriigiisa lagu dilay goordhow

Kooxo hubeysan ayaa Maanta Magalada Muqdisho waxa ay ku dileen Nin la sheegay in uu ahaa Ganacsade,iyaga oo dilka kadib baxasaday.
Ninka la dilay oo lagu Magacaabi jiray Cabdi Cismaan Afrax oo loo yaqaano (Cabdi Biifane),waxana la sheegay in dadkii dilka geystay ay ugu tageen Hoygiisa oo ku yaalla Agagaarka ex-koontorool Afgooye ee Magalada Muqdisho.
Qaar ka mid ah eheladiisa ayaa waxa ay Dalsan u sheegeen in Xilli uu ka soo baxayay Gurigiisa rag hubeysan ay rasaaseeyeen,isla markaana ay dilka kadib ka qaateen Gaari Prado ah oo uu watay,waxaana rasaasta lagu furay ku dhaawacantay Gabar uu dhalay oo guriga ku sugneyd.
Cabdi Cismaan Afrax oo loo yaqaano (Cabdi Biifane) ayaa sida Eheladiisa ay sheegeen waxa uu ahaa Ganacsatada soo dejisa Gawaarida,hayeeshee aysan garan Karin sababta loo dilay iyo dadka ka dambeeyay dilkiisa ma sahlana in ganacsade gurigiisa loogu tago ee la dilo
Ciidamo ka torsan kuwa Dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa tegay Goobta dilka ka dhacay wallow dadkii dilka geystay ay ku baxsadeen Gaariga uu lahaa Ganacsadaha la dilay.
dhanka kale Koox hubeysan ayaa xalay waxaa ay Ganacsade ku dileen gudaha  Magaalada Boosaaso ee Gobalka Barri.
Marxuumka la dilay ayaa waxaa lagu Magacaabi jiray  Shaafici Cabdullaahi Qarshe.
Kooxda dilka geysatay ayaa goobta ka baxsaday, iyadoona halkaasi ay gaareen dilka kadib ciidamada amaanka ee Magaalada Boosaaso, iyagoona halkaasi baaritaano ka sameeyay.
Ma jiraan weli wax war ah oo ka soo baxay saraakiisha ciidamada amaanka ee Magaalada Boosaaso ee Gobalka Barri.
Magaaalada Boosaaso ayaa waxaa ka mid tahay meelaha inta badan ay ka dhacaan dilalka qorsheysan oo ay geystaan koox hubeysan.
 
Guddoomiyaha Golaha Shacabka oo ka hor...
Guddoomiyaha Golaha Shacabka oo ka hor yimid kala diristii guddiga Maaliyadda  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEhyk1ITA-c
Ra’iisul Wasaare Khayre Oo Qado Sharaf...

Ra’iisul wasaaraha xukuumadda federaalka Soomaaliya, mudane Xasan Cali Khayre ayaa hoygiisa qado ugu sameeyay guddiga madaxa bannaan ee dib-u-eegista dastuurka, guddiga labada aqal ee dib-u-eegista iyo la socodka arrimaha dastuurka iyo wasiirka arrimaha dastuurka.
Guddiga madaxa bannaan ee dib-u-eegista dastuurka iyo guddiga labada aqal ee dib-u-eegista iyo la socodka arrimaha dastuurka, ayaa ra’iisul wasaaare Xasan Cali Khayre uga warbixiyay halka ay marayso hawosha dib-u-eegista dastuurka.
Wasiirka arrimaha dastuurka, Cabdiraxmaan Xoosh Jibriil, ayaa sheegay in shanta cusutub ee ugu horraysa dastuurka lagu sameeyay dib-u-eegis afata cutub ee ku xigtana dib-u-eegistooda lasoo gebagebaynayo bishaan gudaheeda taas oo ka dhigan in 75% dastuurka dib-u-eegis lagu sameeyay, uuna rajaynayo in horraanta sannadka 2019 la gebagebaynayo guud ahaan dib u eegista farsamo ee dastuurka ku-meel gaarka ah ee dalka.
Ra’iisul wasaaraha xukuumadda federaalka Soomaaliya ayaa guddiga madaxa bannaan ee dib-u-eegista dastuurka, guddiga labada aqal ee dib-u-eegista iyo la socodka arrimaha dastuurka iyo wasiirka arrimaha dastuurka, u sheegay in hawla badan oo qaranka muhiim u ah ay ku xiranyihiin qabya-tirka dastuurka, sidaa darteed baahi wayn loo qabo in guddiyadu ay laba jibbaaraan dadar-gelinnta gudashada waajibaadka saaran.
Khilaaf mar kale Hareeyey madaxweynaha...

Wararka laga helayo Maamulka Galmudug ayaa sheegaya in uu khilaaf soo kala dhex galay Madaxweynaha Galmudug iyo hogaanka sare ee Ahlu-Suna, waxaana khilaafkaasi uu salka ku haayaa, doorashada Madaxweyne ku xigeenka Madaxweyne Xaaf.
Ahlu-suna ayaa la sheegayaa in ay doonayaan in Madaxweyne ku xigeenka Galmudug loo doorto shaqsi ay iyagu wataan balse Madaxweyne Xaaf ayaa iska diidan sida muuqata waxa uuna taasi badalkeeda doonayaa in uu Madaxweyne ku xigeenkiisa noqdo ruux ay isku dhawyihiin si uu ugu baaqsado khilaaf kala oo soo kala dhex galla madaxweyne ku xigeenkiisa la dooran doono.
Wararka ayaa intaas ku daraya in khilaafkaani soo kala dhex galay Madaxweynaha Galmudug Axmed Ducaalle Geelle (Xaaf) iyo hogaanka sare ee Ahlu-suna in uu sooo jiitamaayey ilaamaa markii Xildhibaanada Galmudug garabkooda fadhiya Magaalada Dhuuso-Mareyb ay shaaciyeen in xilkii madaxweyne ku xigeenka maamulkaasi ay ka xayuubiyeen Cabdi Xaashi Carbeey, waxaase hada sida muuqata uu gaaray khilaafkaani meel xun.
Madaxweyne Xaaf ayaa dadaal dheer ku bixinaaya in uu Ahlu-suna uu ku qanciyo in shaqsiga uu wato uu madaxweyne ku xigeen u noqdo balse ahlu-suna ayaa ka biyo diidan rabitaanka Xaaf.
Dagaalkii dhumay beeshii beesha dagaal...
ugaasyo suldaano naabdoono iyo waxgarad kale oo aan dagaalamin ayaa saxiixa ku duugay qoraalka ka soo baxay magaalada Jigjiga ee deeganka somali satate
Beelihii dhawaan ku dagaalamay Deegaano ka tirsan Gobalka Sool ayaa waxaa heshiis ku gaareen Magaalada Jigjiga.
Dhanacyadii isku hayay Deegaanka Dhumay ee Gobalka Sool ayaa waxaa ay balan qaaday in mar dambe uusan soo laaban doonin dagaal uu ka dhaco Gobalkaasi.
Waxbyaabaha lagu heshiiyay ayaa waxaa ka mid ahaa in Beeshii weerar ku qaadda Magaalo ay deggantahay beesha kale laga qaado lacag dhan $100,000 (Boqol Kun ) oo doollarka Mareykanka ah.
kala horeynta abwaanada iyo fanaaniinta

10 Mulaxamiinta Heesaha Soomaalida.
(1). Cabdikariim Qaareey (Jiir).
(2). Axmed Nuur Jaango.
(3). Xasan Giriite.
(4). Jiimi Sh.Muumin.
(5). Axmed Gacayte.
(6). Axmed Cali Cigaal.
(7). Maxamed Mooge.
(8). Saalax Qaasim Naaji.
(9). Salaad Darbi.
(10). …..?
 
*Saddexda Abwaan ee ugu Riwaayad Badan.
 
(1). Sangub.
(2). Xasan Ganey.
(3). Axmed Saleebaan Bide.
 
*Saddexda Abwaan ee Ugu Heeso Curin Badan.
 
(1). Axmed Saleebaan Bide.
(2). Maxamed Cali Kaariye.
(3). Xasan Ganey.
 
*Saddexda Heesood Ee Ugu Caansan Soomaalida.
 
(1). Baladweyn oo Uu Sameeyey Hadraawi.. Xasan Aadana Qaado.
(2). Hooyooy La,aanta oo Uu Sameeyey Hadraawi Qaadona Tubeec.
(3). Jeceyl dhiig ma lagu Qoray oo Uu Sameeyey Hadraawi Magoolna Qaado..
 
*Tobanka Fanaan Ee Ragga Soomaalida Ugu Horreysa.
 
(1). Maxamed Saleebaan Tubeec.
(2). Maxamed Mooge.
(3). Maxamed Axmed Kuluc.
(4). Maxamed Nuur Giriig.
(5). Xasan Aadan.
(6). Cumar Dhuule.
(7). Muuse Ismaaciil qalinle
(8). Salaad Darbi.
(9). Axmed Cali Cigaal.
(10). Axmed Mooge..
 
*Shanta Fanaan ee hablaha Soomaalida Ugu Caansan.
 
(1). Magool
(2). Sahra Axmed.
(3). Aamina Cabdilaahi.
(4). Khadra Daahir.
(5). Saado Cali
 
*Saddexda fanaan ee Ugu Heeso Badan Soomaalida.
 
(1). Xasan Aadan.
(2). Sahra axmed.
(3). Magool..
 
*Riwaayadii Ugu Daawashada Badneed Soomaalida.
 
(1). Qabrigii Jeceylka oo Uu Sameeyey Abwaan Sangub.
Actors na Ay ka ahaayeen Salaad darbi iyo Saynab Cige.
 
*Saddexdii Abwaan ee Ugu Horeeyey Curinta Heesaha Jeceylka.
 
(1). Kaariye.
(2). Huryo.
(3). Hadraawi.
 
*Shantii Majaajileeste ee Ugu Horeeyey Soomaaliya.
 
(1). Huryo.
(2). Meecaad Miigane.
(3). Basbaas.
(4). Boon Xirsi.
(5). Aw koombe
 
#Tubeec Boqorka Codka.
#Magool Boqorada Codka
#Khadra Daahira Boqorada Heesaha jeceylka.
#Baxsan Boqorada Heesaha Wadaniga ah.
 
Daljirka Dahsoon inta waxaa ku daray Boqorada Heesaha Mucaaridka Saado Cali Warsame, midhka Tobnaad Mulaxamiinta ka dhiman u kala door labadan Abwaan /Mulaxam
 
1.Bare Maxamed Fiidow
 
2.Mustafe Kiiko. Midkood
“Waxaynu Doorashadda u Doonaynaa waa...
“Waxaynu Doorashadda u Doonaynaa waa Inaynaan is Dilin, Madawaynuhuna,”Sheekh aadan Siiro.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJQsbyhPHfc
La soco Wadahaladii somalia iyo...

FORWARDED AS RECEIVED
War aan ka hellay ilo diblomaasiyadeed gallabta ayaa ii xaqiijiyay in maraykanku doonayo in xal kama danbays ah laga gaadho wada-haladda siyaasadeed ee u dhexeeya Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya.
Warka aan hellay ayaa ii xaqiijiyay in maraykanku doonayo in wada-hadaladda loo sameeyo jadwal cad oo leh wakhti bilaw iyo dhamaad leh, isla markaana wata heshiis sharci oo bulshada caalamku goob joog ka ahaato.
Warka aan hellay ayaa ii xaqiijiyay inay dhawaan Somaliland uu iman doonaan wefdi uu hogaaminayo danjiraha cusub ee dawladda maraykanka ee Soomaaliya Ambassador Don Yamamoto, oo isagu qayb weyn ku yeelan doona wada-hadalka.
*Sida xogtu ii xaqiijisay Ambassador Yamamoto oo ahaa maskaxdii ka danbaysay wada hadaladdii Eritrea iyo Ethiopia* ayaa doonaya in qaabkii loo dhamaystiray loo soo afjaro arrinta Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya.
Danjiraha qaramada midoobay u qaabilsan arrimaha Soomaaliya ayaa isaguna qayb weyn ku yeelan doona wada hadalka
Shariikadaha maraykanka ee salliida ee Chevron iyo Conocophilips oo sannadahii 80 naadkii dawladdii Maxamed Siyaad Barre heshiis kula gallay inay salliid iyo shidaal ka qodaan Somaliland ayaa xogtu ii iftimisay inay qayb ka yahiin dedaalka la doonayo in lagu dhamaystiro arrinta masiiriga ah ee u dhexaysa Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya.
*Qorshaha ayaa ah in madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland Muuse Biixi Cabdi iyo madaxweynaha Dawladda Federaalka ah ee Soomaaliya Maxamed Cabdilaahi Farmaajo ay kulan ku yeeshan dhamaadka bisha January ama horaanta bisha February magaaladda Jibouti ee xarunta* *Jamhuuriyadda Jibouti.*
Wixii ka danbeeya labada dhinac ayaa soo xuli doona guddiyo ka qayb gali doona wada-hadaladda labada dhinac. Wadahadaladda ayaa ka qabsoomi doona Jibouti.
Wadahaladda ayaa kuwii hore kaga duwanaan doona iyadoo beesha caalamku u samayn doonta ajande iyo jadwal ay labada dhinac raali ka wada yahiin isla markaana wada-hadaladdu ku qotomi doonaan.
Beesha caalamka ayaa goob joog ka noqon doonta wada hadalka, halka dawladda Jibouti na ay ku matali doonto dhex dhexaadin iyo garnaqista labada dhinac.
Dhawaan waxaa magaaladda Washington tagi doona laba wefdi oo ka kala socda Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya, waxaanay kulan la yeelan doonaan kaaliyaha xoghayaha arrimaha dibadda maraykanka u qaabilsan arrimaha Afrika *Tibor Peter Nagy Jr.* oo isaga laftigiisu arrimahan Jibouti u joogay usbuuc ka hor.
Dhageyso Axmed Madoobe Xaalada somaliya...

Madaxweynaha Jubbaland Axmed Maxamed Islaam ayaa warbaahinta u sheegay in xaaladda Soomaaliya xilliggaan ay ku sugan tahay ay tahay Mid u baahan in si deg deg ah wax looga qabto.
Madaxweynaha ayaa sheegay in Soomaaliya ay ku sugan tahay xaalad halis ah oo u baahan in  waxgaradka Soomaaliyeed iyo xildhibaanada ay doorkooda qaataan si dalka loo badbaadiyo.
Ujeedada ayuu sheegay in tahay in dalka ay maamulaan dad aan ku sugneyn 30-kii sano ee lasoo dhaafay.
Waxaa uu tilmaamay in Xaaladda Soomaaliya cidda wax ka qabankartaa in ay tahay kaliya dadkii Soomaaliyeed ee ku sugnaa 30-kii sano ee lasoo dhaafay.
Hadalka Madaxweynaha Jubbaland ayaa u muuqday in uu dhaliil uga dhigaayay Madaxda ugu sareysa Soomaaliya oo ah kuwo qurbo joog ah, islamarkaana 30-kii sano ee ugu dambeeyay kunoolaa dalka dibadiisa.
http://somalisan.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Madoobe.mp3